Prime Efficiency Ratio (PER). Measuring How Effectively Prime Tokens Are Used

Prime Token

What is the Prime Token and what is its purpose? Let’s refer to the official documentation.

What is Prime?

Venus Protocol is excited to announce Venus Prime, a revolutionary incentive program aimed to bolster user engagement and growth within the protocol. An integral part of Venus Tokenomics v3.1, Venus Prime aims to enhance rewards and promote $XVS staking, focusing on markets including USDT, USDC, BTC and ETH.

What was expected from the introduction of the Prime token?

Venus Prime aims to incentivize larger stake sizes and diverse user participation. This is expected to significantly increase the staking of XVS, the Total Value Locked (TVL), and market growth.

Simply put, the Prime token is a financial instrument that allows XVS stakers to receive more favorable lending and borrowing conditions across supported markets.
As of this proposal, Prime impacts the following markets: USDT, USDC, BTC, and ETH.
More XVS staked == better APY == higher Total Supply / Total Borrow.

But is this actually happening?
Are Prime token holders really participating in the USDT, USDC, BTC, and ETH markets — or are these tokens being minted in vain? Let’s find out.

All data, calculations, and token prices are fixed at block 64714540 (Oct-15-2025 01:37:01 PM +UTC). Only BSC network is considered.

Prime Token Utilization

Let’s gather a dataset containing all (as of block 64714540) 500 Prime token holders, their minting timestamps, XVS staked amount, XVS’ value in USD and the total supplied and borrowed balances in USD equivalent for USDC, USDT, BTC, and ETH markets.

To collect this data, we need to:

  1. Scan the Prime contract history to track all mint/burn events.
  2. Gather information about deposits and borrows from addresses currently holding Prime tokens.

An example of a Prime holder record:

mint_time:               2025-02-28 15:43:09
address:                 0x4905083abdd13bd95345a871701fd0b08abd46d1
xvs_staked:              1082.43
xvs_usd_balance:         5945.26
supply_usdc_usd_balance: 300668.57
borrow_usdc_usd_balance: 0
supply_usdt_usd_balance: 52065.38
borrow_usdt_usd_balance: 0
supply_btc_usd_balance:  467731.73
borrow_btc_usd_balance:  0
supply_eth_usd_balance:  0
borrow_eth_usd_balance:  232173.21
per:                     3.16

After collecting the data, it is possible to determine which Prime holders actually use their Prime tokens as intended — i.e., those who periodically increase their Vault or Core Pool positions, thereby contributing to market growth and liquidity.

Part 1

Prime Efficiency Ratio (PER)

To determine how effectively each address utilizes their Prime token, let’s introduce a new metric: Prime Efficiency Ratio (PER).

Prime Efficiency Ratio (PER) — a metric that shows how effectively a user’s XVS stake translates into real protocol benefit through market activity.

In other words:

PER represents the efficiency of XVS staking utilization.

We’ll refer to the Prime documentation formula that determines a user’s qualified balances (deposits and borrows that count toward Prime rewards):
Prime Yield Documentation

Markdown formula
$$
σ_{i,m} = min(τ_i * supplyMultiplier_m, vSupplied_{i,m}) + min(τ_i * borrowMultiplier_m, vBorrowed_{i,m})
$$

Oh, md formulas does not work. Ok, I will screenshot it, lol

Where:

  • τ_i — XVS staked by user i
  • vSupplied_{i,m} — supplied balance by user i on market m
  • vBorrowed_{i,m} — borrowed balance by user i on market m
  • supplyMultiplier_m, borrowMultiplier_m — multipliers for each market m

Define the efficiency coefficient for how effectively a user’s XVS stake contributes to activity:

Markdown formula
$$
PER_{i,m} = (τ_i^α * σ_{i,m}^{1 - α}) / τ_i = τ_i^{α - 1} * σ_{i,m}^{1 - α}
$$

where α ∈ (0,1) — a weighting coefficient for XVS staking strength.

To compute the total efficiency across all markets:

Markdown formula
$$
PER_i^{total} = (τ_i^α * (Σ_m σ_{i,m})^{1 - α}) / τ_i = τ_i^{α - 1} * (Σ_m σ_{i,m})^{1 - α}
$$

  • Sum all σ across markets to get the total activity of the user.
  • Then apply the PER formula for the overall efficiency.

Interpretation:

  • Local PER reflects user’s efficiency within a single market.
  • Total PER reflects user’s efficiency across all supported markets.

Local PER values cannot be linearly summed due to the nonlinear exponent term (1−α).

PER > 1 → XVS is used super efficiently. The user could stake more XVS for even better market conditions since their deposits/borrows significantly outweigh their staked mass.
PER = 1 → optimal usage. All assets are efficiently utilized; APY terms fully reflect the Prime influence.
PER < 1 → XVS is underutilized. The user should increase their deposit/borrow volume to leverage Prime benefits effectively.

Example PER calculation:
alpha = 0.5 (source: Prime contract)
usdc supplierMultiplier = 2 (source: Prime contract)
usdc borrowMultiplier = 0 (source: Prime contract)
usdt supplierMultiplier = 2 (source: Prime contract)
usdt borrowMultiplier = 0 (source: Prime contract)

User τ_i (XVS staked) USDC supplied USDC borrowed USDT supplied USDT borrowed Total PER_i
User 1 1000 500 0 300 0 1.049
User 2 1000 400 100 500 0 1.000
User 3 1000 300 200 200 100 0.894

Ideal PER

Some may have already noticed that PER equals 1 when the value of locked XVS (in USD equivalent) is equal to our sigma — the sum of qualified (eligible) supply and borrow balances for the user across markets.

Сonsider this an ideal balance to strive for, as when PER equals 1, users receive better market conditions while the protocol gains a more active participant. Win-Win.

PER < 1 (The XVS mass is significantly greater than the mass of market deposits/borrows)

A PER below 1 indicates that the Prime token is not being used efficiently by the address holding it.
The address keeps more XVS in the Vault (in USD equivalent) than the total amount of qualified (eligible) supplied and borrowed balances across markets.

How many such addresses?

SELECT count() FROM prime_addresses_utilization WHERE per < 1

RESULT: 252

How much additional liquidity can we attract to the supply and borrow markets if all addresses had PER equal to 1?
To find out, let’s calculate how much (in USD equivalent) the markets are lacking in qualified supply and borrow balances.

SELECT
    SUM(
        xvs_usd_balance 
        -
        (
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 2, supply_usdc_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 0, borrow_usdc_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 2, supply_usdt_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 0, borrow_usdt_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 2, supply_btc_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 4, borrow_btc_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 2, supply_eth_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 4, borrow_eth_usd_balance)
        )
    ) AS total_additional_sigma
FROM prime_addresses_utilization
WHERE per < 1;

RESULT: 9.60 million

9.6 million in qualified supply and borrow balances could be additionally attracted to the supply and borrow markets for the Prime token to be considered efficiently used.

PER > 1 (The XVS mass is significantly less than the mass of market deposits/borrows)

A PER above 1 indicates that the address holds less XVS in the Vault (in USD equivalent) than the total amount of qualified supplied and borrowed balances across markets.

PER above 1 indicates that the Prime token is used super efficiently by the address. This is good for the protocol, but the user may gain access to even better conditions.
(That is, the address keeps less XVS in the Vault, in USD equivalent, than the total amount of qualified balances it provides across markets.)

How many such addresses?

SELECT count() **FROM** prime_addresses_utilization WHERE per > 1

RESULT: 248

248 — not surprising, since 252 addresses have PER below 1.

How much additional liquidity can we attract into the Vault if all addresses had PER equal to 1?
We’ll do the same as before when calculating PER < 1, but in this case, we’ll be adding XVS into staking so that users get better APY conditions based on their existing market activity.

SELECT
    SUM(
        (
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 2, supply_usdc_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 0, borrow_usdc_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 2, supply_usdt_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 0, borrow_usdt_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 2, supply_btc_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 4, borrow_btc_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 2, supply_eth_usd_balance) +
            LEAST(xvs_usd_balance * 4, borrow_eth_usd_balance)
        )
        -
        xvs_usd_balance 
    ) AS total_additional_sigma
FROM prime_addresses_utilization
WHERE per < 1;

RESULT: 14.71 million

14.71 million XVS (in USD equivalent) could be additionally attracted into the XVS Vault if users were incentivized with better APYs relative to their current market activity.
(In this case, it would be more profitable to stake additional XVS rather than supply or borrow assets on the markets.)

Part 2

Minimum required PER

In this proposal, I would like to introduce a mechanism to incentivize the efficient use of the Prime token — specifically when PER < 1.

I won’t consider the part that incentivizes users with higher PER to move toward 1.
Those addresses are already efficient enough, and encouraging them to stake even more XVS could be addressed in a separate proposal.
Although, truth be told, it’s already in users’ own interest to aim for PER = 1, as it improves their market conditions without additional actions.

How can we encourage users with low PER to maintain it at or above 1?

At the contract level, it’s proposed to introduce a min_per parameter (configured by governance), defining the minimum PER required for an account holding a Prime token.

An address acquiring a Prime token agrees to provide enough liquidity (by supplying or borrowing) to the markets.
If the address fails to meet this condition within N days (governance-defined), it loses the Prime token and gets a M-day freeze before it can mint another one — to avoid instant re-minting after burning.

The Prime token is not a badge of honor. It’s a financial instrument.

The Prime token unlocks new opportunities for both Prime holders (better APY) and the protocol itself (more supply/borrow → more fees).
Those who just want to stake XVS don’t need to acquire the Prime token.

Since such a change may seem drastic and not all addresses might want to adopt this new logic (even though it clearly benefits both sides), it’s proposed to start with min_per < 1 and gradually raise it over time (e.g., every 3 months).

Let’s assume the initial min_per equals 0.5 and reaches 1 in 6 months (increasing by 0.25 every 3 months).

Drawbacks of introducing min_per

I don’t see any :slight_smile:
This parameter is designed to stimulate both new XVS staking and greater activity across markets.

But for curiosity’s sake, let’s imagine some Prime token holders don’t want to take advantage of the beneficial APY conditions on the markets.

  1. Let’s answer this together:
    Will a Prime holder who only stakes XVS without any market activity lose anything if their Prime token is revoked?

    • No. Their position remains the same. They continue earning from staking as before.
  2. How many XVS “whales” (Prime token holders) have per < 0.5?
    Let’s assume a whale is defined as an address with over 10,000 XVS staked.

SELECT sum(xvs_usd_balance) FROM
prime_addresses_utilization WHERE per < 0.5 AND
xvs_staked >= 10_000
   
RESULT: 31

How much XVS do they hold in USD equivalent?

SELECT sum(xvs_usd_balance) FROM prime_addresses_utilization WHERE per < 1 AND xvs_staked >= 10_000

RESULT: 6.76 million

Yes, some XVS might be sold, but the potential for attracting new market liquidity and XVS Vault deposits outweighs that risk.

p.s. The difference in sum(xvs_usd_balance) between per < 0.5 and per < 1 is only 3 million.

Benefits of introducing min_per

The most obvious one — increased Total Supply / Total Borrow, leading to higher protocol revenue.

A higher overall Total Supply / Total Borrow ratio might also allow the protocol to consider increasing the number of offered Prime tokens.

A higher Total Supply / Total Borrow ratio for an address will encourage it to stake more XVS to access better APY conditions on the markets.

Expected impact of implementation:


Conclusion

Part 1 is the most critical part of this proposal, introducing a clear metric for assessing the efficiency of Prime token utilization. (Mandatory for implementation)

Part 2 is a logical next step following the introduction of the PER metric, allowing further incentivization of effective Prime token usage. (Recommended for implementation)

Introducing the PER metric will create a system that helps Prime token holders understand how efficiently they’re using their tokens — which in turn will attract more liquidity to markets and increase XVS staking in the Vault.

Even now, we could attract 9.60 million additionally to markets and 14.71 million to XVS staking.

PER is the opportunity to finally realize the true power and purpose of the Prime token.

Thank you for your attention — let’s make Venus great again!

p.s. Since the forum doesn’t allow sharing files other than images, anyone who wants to verify my calculations or build their own models can DM me, and I’ll provide the JSON file with all the data I have.

I apologize for not being able to understand complex formulas.

The current challenge is that USDT and USDC are each sharing around $50,000, and Prime Boost APY is not offering attractive numbers.

Given this situation, please answer the following question:

Q1. Given the current Boost APY is unattractive, some Prime users might consider depositing their crypto elsewhere or, weighing the risks, choose to hold off for now.
This is Venus’s issue, and forcing users to deposit assets under these circumstances feels unreasonable.
Prime users are highly loyal, staking XVS long-term.
We want to avoid putting these users at a disadvantage.
Will this be acceptable to them?

Q2. If Prime users deposit large amounts of crypto assets eligible for Boost APY, won’t this further reduce the Boost APY per wallet?
Won’t this make it appear even less attractive and potentially damage the Prime service brand itself?

Personally, I’m very concerned that this could eliminate the reason to hold XVS, reduce its appeal, prompt whales to sell XVS, drive down the price, and potentially make XVS irrecoverable :sweat_smile:

3 Likes

Hi, thanks for your questions.

Q1: Given the current Boost APY is unattractive, some Prime users might consider depositing their crypto elsewhere or, weighing the risks, choose to hold off for now. Will it be acceptable?

Absolutely. The PER proposal does not force anyone to deposit or stake XVS. It’s purely a metric to measure efficiency of XVS usage for supplying/borrowing.

Loyal users who are already staking XVS long-term remain completely safe — their rewards and positions do not change.

My calculations show that currently 252 addresses have PER < 1 (underutilized), meaning there’s potential to attract $9.6M in additional liquidity without affecting anyone who chooses not to participate.

So, holding off is totally fine — nothing in this proposal penalizes passive stakers.

Q2: Will depositing more reduce Boost APY per wallet and make it unattractive?

Theoretically, APY adjusts with more deposits, but PER is not about manipulating APY. It’s about revealing how effectively XVS is used.

Users will be not forced to stake or deposit more — the calculations indicate that actively participating addresses could unlock $14.71M additional XVS staking, but this only applies to those who choose to engage.

Passive stakers and “whales” who don’t increase activity face no risk, their existing XVS staking continues to earn as before.


Guess I need to mention why the proposal is split into two parts:

Part 1 (Mandatory): Introduces the PER metric, providing a clear measure of XVS efficiency without requiring any user action.

Part 2 (Recommended): Suggests optional incentives for addresses with PER < 1, unlocking more liquidity and potentially better APY for active users. This is gradual and optional, so loyal stakers are never disadvantaged.

This is a tightening of the policy for XVS holders, which will definitely negatively impact the token’s price. In my opinion, the prime token will automatically become more valuable and operational when the protocol’s TVL increases significantly.

Risk-related questions

Token revocation: What happens if a user temporarily falls below the minimum PER - will their Prime token be revoked immediately?

Fairness: Does the PER system give an unfair advantage to large XVS holders who can easily adjust their share or supply?

Market impact: could the introduction of a minimum PER cause some Prime holders to sell XVS, putting downward pressure on the token price?

User experience: how will regular users track and maintain their PER without advanced dashboards or analytics tools?

Parameter volatility: What safeguards are in place if management unexpectedly raises min_per or changes the multipliers?

Technical reliability: How will the contract ensure accurate PER calculations and prevent false Prime revocations due to oracle or logic errors?

Passive holders: Will passive XVS stakers lose motivation to hold Prime if participation requires constant market activity?

Grace periods: Will users receive a warning or grace period before losing Prime status due to low PER?

Potential for manipulation: Can users artificially inflate PER using cyclical or flash strategies without real benefit to the protocol?

Implementation risk: Could stricter PER rules reduce the number of new users or make Prime too complex or punitive?

1 Like

i agree about your opinion
Players can change their borrowing or deposit positions at any time based on market conditions and investment needs(we can either eliminate the deposit or increase the borrow). We invested time to take prime. This eliminates the need to hold XVS long-term. I don’t think anyone would consider buying XVS just to earn a few percent additional interest.

Prime is a product for long-term holders of 1,000 or more XVS

I understand the concern, but it’s important to clarify that the PER is not a tightening of policy — it’s a measurement tool, a guide for investors on how to use their Prime tokens more efficiently, not a restriction or penalty.

The PER simply shows how well your staked XVS translates into real protocol benefit via deposits and borrows. Holding XVS in staking without using markets isn’t punished — PER just highlights that there’s an opportunity to earn more APY with the same assets. In other words, it’s a hint to do more with less, not a mandate.

Looking at the numbers from the proposal:

  • About 9.6 million USD of additional liquidity could be attracted to supply/borrow markets if underutilized XVS is optimized.
  • About 14.71 million USD worth of XVS could be added to the Vault, increasing staking rewards for participants.

This shows that adhering to PER doesn’t hurt holders — it actually helps them earn better yields, improves market efficiency, and naturally increases XVS demand.

So rather than negatively impacting XVS price, PER gives a roadmap for maximizing returns with minimal extra effort. As the protocol’s TVL grows, Prime tokens will naturally become more valuable, and PER helps users see how to capture that value effectively.

In short: PER is guidance, not enforcement, and following it is in the best interest of holders and the protocol alike.

You’re right that Prime is aimed at long-term holders of 1,000+ XVS. The PER metric isn’t about forcing anyone to deposit or borrow more — it’s a guidance tool that shows how efficiently a holder’s current XVS is contributing to the protocol. In other words, PER tells investors **where they could gain more protocol benefits or APY.

So, long-term holders don’t lose anything by ignoring PER. It’s just a way to highlight opportunities to earn more efficiently if they want.

Thanks!

Token revocation: Yes, there should be a grace period. A Prime token is not revoked immediately if PER temporarily falls below min_per. Users have N days to adjust their activity. This avoids sudden penalties and gives loyal holders flexibility.

But again, its just part 2 of proposal. We can go with only first part and return to the second one next time.

Fairness: PER measures efficiency of XVS usage, not absolute amounts. Large XVS holders don’t get an inherent advantage — the metric compares XVS staked versus market participation.

Market impact: The design minimizes negative pressure on XVS. Only a small subset of “whales”(more than 10k) have PER below 0.5, and the difference in staked XVS between PER < 0.5 and PER < 1 accounts for roughly 3 million USD — a minor figure compared to the overall protocol liquidity. Moreover, PER doesn’t trigger any forced selling; it’s purely informational, not punitive.

On the other hand, we expect around 14.71 million USD worth of new XVS to enter staking, which represents a strong positive inflow and supports the protocol’s long-term sustainability.

User experience: PER is only for Prime holders :sweat_smile: (PER = Prime Efficiency Ratio)
PER is simply a metric layered on top of the existing prime reward calculation logic.

Parameter volatility: Governance defines the min_per threshold and can adjust multipliers gradually. The proposal even suggests incrementally increasing min_per (for example, every three months) rather than making abrupt changes, ensuring predictability and stability for users.

And let’s not forget about the grace period — if anything unexpected happens, there will be enough time to react, make adjustments, or revert changes if needed. (Again, it is part 2, which is only recommended like a logical way and is not supposed to happen until refined / confirmed)

Technical reliability: PER is calculated on-chain using verified staked XVS and market balances, following a logic similar to the Prime Rewards formula. The system relies solely on existing protocol data, ensuring consistency and transparency.

False revocations are prevented through the grace period and carefully designed contract logic. Oracles do not introduce any additional risk, since all inputs are already part of the Venus infrastructure.

Passive holders: Passive holders don’t lose XVS or current staking benefits. PER is informational (for Prime only holders) and encourages efficiency. Those who prefer purely passive staking can continue to do so safely — they just might not want to maximize APY relative to their potential.

Grace periods: Yes, users get a configurable grace period before any penalty. This avoids surprises and allows time to adjust activity if needed.

Potential for manipulation: As mentioned above, the PER formula is based on the Prime Rewards formula. There is no room for manipulation, thanks to the existing market multipliers already used in calculating Prime rewards.

Implementation risk: PER is simply a metric that shows users how efficiently they are using their Prime tokens and where they could potentially earn more by supplying, borrowing, or staking.


The goal of PER is to give users a clear view of their Prime activity. The better users understand how their supplying, borrowing, and staking affect their positions, the more confident they are.

PER is not about any tightenings or punitive measures. It is purely an informational metric designed to help users understand how efficiently they are using their Prime tokens.

1 Like

I’m against implementing this change. It wastes the team’s efforts, and:

  1. You can already see qualified balances in the Prime calculator. We can add one line of text to implement what is proposed - “For maximum benefits, you need to provide an amount close to the qualified limits”
  2. It is not how prime was advertised initially - Venus Prime | Venus Protocol

    There were talks about irrevocable prime, not otherwise
  3. While we can consider updating Prime terms in the future, making changes now — when Prime benefits are valued at $50K/month - would be a disaster.
    Essentially, it sends the message: “Pay attention, despite your loyalty to Venus over the years, your decision was a mistake. Prime gives you nothing. Give us more money or we’ll remove your status.”
    That’s just crazy.
  4. A lot of people bought XVS when price was over $100 and they still hold. Probably it was an irrational decision, and holding prime may also be irrational decision as of now. Asking them to reconsider this, when prime gives you almost nothing is very bad. Because logical answer is - unstake and sell.

Money will follow if the product provides value to users. Changing the formula while it’s still effectively multiplying by zero makes no sense. Why is no one using ARB/ETH Prime?

Given that there is a non-zero probability that this change could:

  1. Trigger mass XVS unstaking and market selling
  2. Be perceived as a violation of terms and a sign of disrespect toward loyal users
    I’m against this.
2 Likes
  1. Yes, that’s exactly what the PER metric is designed to do — you understood it correctly. PER will highlight opportunities to the user (how they can optimize their XVS staking and market activity).

  2. The idea of irrevocable Prime will never happen. I’ve confirmed this — it was an abandoned concept that was supposed to reward old participants. Part 2 of the proposal is just a set of thoughts on how to incentivize more active use of Prime tokens.

  3. I don’t see how this concern relates to the current topic. PER is purely an informational metric, not a policy change.

  4. As I mentioned in previous comments and in the post itself — no one will lose anything. Large holders will continue their staking exactly as before. The real question is: “why hold a Prime token if it’s not being used?” There are plenty of other whales who can bring significant liquidity and actively use Prime. Prime is a financial instrument, not a toy.

In conclusion, my proposal is focused on providing information and encouraging efficient usage, not on enforcing strict measures or restrictions. I am also an XVS holder and care about its growth just as much as anyone here. But without improvements and increased liquidity, the growth of XVS — which we all hope for — will not happen.

You have included the part 2, that’s why. If we look at this without part 2, who is the target audience? 1% of 500 people who are already loyal? Do they really need it? Do we really need to optimize something when budget is $50000/500 per user?

no one will lose anything” - Who will implement it? Isn’t the team busy with other tasks that may improve TVL/revenue? Why focus on feature for 5 people who may use this instead of building one click looping or something else?

Regarding this metric being purely informational:

We can certainly improve the text on the calculator/documentation page, ask the Stars/Marketing team to produce an explainer video, or you can share an external calculator or spreadsheet that people can explore on their own.

However, my main concern is with the timing. Introducing a feature that draws users’ attention to something - especially when Prime isn’t currently functioning well and the benefits are minimal - will only lead to confusion or disappointment. This purely informational metric will bring only disappointment to people who will see it.

First, Prime rewards were exhausted and stopped working. Then came the removal of Prime for borrowers. Now there’s discussion about a metric that feels like the first step toward adding more criteria for Prime eligibility and revoking prime for loyal users.
Do you see the point? Every new change feels like another disappointment.

What’s the message? “Hey, you’re underutilizing your Prime spot - bring in $500K to fully utilize it and earn extra 0.1% on USDC and 0% on ETH?”

The idea of explaining Prime status in more detail is good in principle. But doing so right now feels poorly timed and likely counterproductive.

I like that the Prime banner on the front page was replaced with E-Mode. We shouldn’t highlight features that aren’t really working right now.

1 Like

I agree that providing extra information is valuable. But we should focus on highlighting good news and growth metrics - not disappointments or data that emphasize what isn’t working right now. Maybe we should add more positive graphs or metrics from Venus metrics | Token Terminal to the main UI — there are some metrics that improve each month.

I don’t see why team should implement a metric that highlight a negative side when there are other things to do or positive metrics. Especially after a series of bad news related to prime.

1 Like

Honestly, I think this proposal is fundamentally flawed.

Firstly, it’s confusing—there are too many calculations to explain something that should be straightforward for the end user.

Secondly, can someone please explain how, with over $35 million in the treasury, the protocol’s market capitalization is only $84 million? Is there any other example like this in DeFi? And how do you justify allocating just 20% of earnings to XVS holders? Even more puzzling, after a 30% price drop, why wasn’t there a massive token buyback?

If management wants investors to redeposit funds, they first need to restore the confidence of their most loyal backers—those of us who have endured all the losses. To me, the proposed solution goes in the exact opposite direction.

2 Likes

I wouldn’t say the proposal is flawed. The formulas used in the post are derived directly from the official Prime rewards formula — nothing is invented or speculative here. Anyone can trace the connection by reviewing the Prime documentation to see how these values interact within the current reward logic.

Regarding the second part of your comment — I’m not entirely sure it applies to this particular proposal. The Prime Efficiency Ratio (PER) doesn’t alter distribution rules or reward allocations; it only introduces a metric that helps users better understand their own Prime status and how effectively their XVS is being utilized.

In short, this isn’t a policy change — it’s an informational tool. It’s meant to guide users, offering insights into how they can make the most out of their Prime participation. Think of it as a way to “see how to use Prime efficiently” — and maybe even discover new opportunities along the way.

I get your point, but that’s exactly why PER matters.

DeFi isn’t about hope — it’s about understanding how your assets work. The Prime Efficiency Ratio doesn’t change rewards or rules; it simply gives holders a clear view of how effectively their XVS is being used.

More insight means more confidence. When users can actually see how their capital performs, they make smarter moves — and that’s what drives real, sustainable growth for both investors and the protocol.

I’ll think about implementing an external calculator, thanks.
Actually, I already have a private analytical web app I use for my own research — I might consider sharing it with the community later if there’s enough interest.

1 Like

This is an excellent and well-structured proposal. Introducing the Prime Efficiency Ratio (PER) provides a clear, data-driven framework to ensure Prime tokens are actively contributing to market growth and XVS staking. I particularly appreciate how it aligns user incentives with protocol health, creating a measurable, win-win system for both participants and Venus itself. Implementing a minimum PER mechanism seems like a logical next step to further encourage optimal token utilization without penalizing genuine stakers. Overall, this approach could significantly enhance liquidity, engagement, and the long-term robustness of the protocol.

1 Like

I understand and respect your concerns — they’re valid points from a long-term holder’s perspective. The goal of the Prime Efficiency Ratio isn’t to force activity, but to encourage a healthier balance between staking and utility. Inactive Prime positions dilute the system’s efficiency, which can limit Venus’ ability to offer more competitive Boost APYs in the future.

By introducing a transparent metric like PER, the protocol can better reward active contributors while still respecting loyal long-term stakers. It’s about creating a more sustainable and performance-driven model, not punishing holders. In the long run, this alignment can actually help restore XVS attractiveness and strengthen its value foundation through real utility and participation.

1 Like